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Consumer Choice and Collective Impact 
Julia Nefsky 
Introduction 
It is 10 p.m. and you are channel surfing. You settle on Beans of Darkness, 
a documentary about injustice in the coffee industry. You learn about 
grueling working conditions, exploitative wage systems that keep farmers 
living in poverty and debt, and the use of child and slave labor. The movie 
ends with a message about our power as consumers to change the 
situation: by demanding fair trade coffee—it says—we can put an end to 
these injustices. On your way to work the next morning, you stop at your 
usual coffee shop. Normally you order the Broadway Blend, but today you 
study the options. There is one coffee labeled “fair trade.” You order it. It 
is decent, but not nearly as good as the Broadway. The following morning, 
back at the coffee shop, you find yourself unable to motivate ordering the 
fair trade coffee again. It is not that you no longer care about the lives of 
coffee farmers. It is that it now seems naïve to think that buying a cup of 
fair trade coffee could do anything to help them. You are a mere speck in a 
sea of coffee drinkers. Realistically, nothing in the industry is going to go 
differently depending on which cup of coffee you buy. What, then, is the 
point in forgoing the tastier coffee? 
Many of us encounter similar barriers when we direct ourselves to 
make ethically conscious food choices. Taken collectively, our food 
choices are the driving factor behind what players in the industry do to 
compete and gain our business. Thus, collectively, they have major 
consequences for human lives, animal lives and the environment. But it is 
far from clear what this fact about our collective food choices tells us 
about any individual choice. When you learn about the suffering inflicted 
on animals on factory farms, or about the exploitation of farmworkers 
throughout the world, or about devastating effects of industrial farming or 
food processing on the environment, what should you conclude about 
what you ought, or ought not, to eat for dinner tonight? 
One major problem in answering this question is that it is often 
difficult to determine which large-scale consumer patterns would result in 
changes for the better. Determining what the actual effects would be of 
various large shifts in consumer demand is a complex matter.1 But even 
supposing that we do know which large-scale consumer patterns would be 
 
1 There is disagreement, for instance, about the effectiveness of the Fair Trade 
certification program at reducing poverty among coffee farmers. In this essay, I will 
assume, for the sake of discussion, that a widespread shift in demand to fair trade coffee 
would be overall better for farmworkers, but I note here that this may not be true. 
better, a problem arises in trying to move from these facts to conclusions 
about what one ought, individually, to do. Suppose we know that grave 
harms or injustices could be prevented if enough people stop buying Xs. 
Intuitively, in such a scenario, morality should yield that each of us ought 
or, at least, has good moral reason to refrain from buying Xs. But the 
trouble is: typically, in such scenarios, it is doubtful that it will make a 
difference whether or not I purchase an X on any given occasion. Most 
present-day food companies operate at too large a scale for a single 
purchase to have an effect on what they do. And if this is right, then for 
each of us, it is unclear what point there is in refraining. Each individual 
can argue, “My purchase won’t make a difference, so I’m not doing 
anything wrong.” It is this second problem that I am concerned with in this 
essay. Call it, “the problem of collective impact.”2 
Many of our food choices face this problem in one way or another. 
For another example, take meat consumption. People often move 
immediately from the fact that tremendous suffering is inflicted on 
animals on factory farms, or that factory farming causes serious 
environmental damage, to the conclusion that it is wrong to purchase 
meat. But this ignores a major complication: it is highly doubtful that my 
 
2 In previous work, I have called this “the problem of collective harm,” but this new 
terminology better captures the nature of the problem. I am grateful to Andrew Franklin-
Hall for this suggestion. 
purchasing some factory-farmed meat will make a difference with respect 
to animal suffering or environmental damage.3 For my purchase to make a 
difference with respect to these things, it must make a difference to what 
happens on the factory farm. And while the factory farm may need to 
adjust production if there is a large shift in demand, a single purchase 
more or less is surely not going to affect what they do. For example, in the 
2013 fiscal year Tyson produced an average of 40.9 million chickens per 
week.4 They are not going to adjust production in virtue of the fact that 
one, or two, or twenty fewer chickens were purchased than usual. 
It is important to see that the “my purchase won’t make a 
difference” claim challenges not only the thought that I am obligated all-
things-considered to refrain from consuming meat but also, and more 
deeply, the thought that there is any moral point at all in refraining (or, 
more precisely, any moral point having to do with animal suffering, or the 
environment). If my purchase will not make a difference with respect to 
animal suffering, this means that things will be exactly the same for 
animals give or take my purchase. And if that is true, it is not clear how 
 
3 There is a third issue with factory farming: its implications for public health. Factory 
farming spreads viruses and antibiotic-resistant bacteria (Anomaly 2015). The problem of 
collective impact arises with respect to this issue too. 
4 Tyson Foods, Inc., Fiscal 2013 Fact Book, 
http://s1.q4cdn.com/900108309/files/doc_downloads/Tyson%202013%20Fact%20Book.
pdf. 
the suffering of animals on factory farms could give me any reason, or 
presumptive moral obligation, not to purchase it, let alone an all-things-
considered obligation.5 
The problem of collective impact is not unique to food choices. It 
arises in any context in which by acting in a certain way, we collectively 
can have a major impact, but in which no individual seems to make a 
difference.6 But, my focus here is on the problem as it arises in the context 
of food choices. Whether one is coming at this from a general interest in 
the problem of collective impact or from an interest in the ethics of food 
choices, it is important to think through how the problem plays out in this 
domain. 
 
5 While I am going to focus on individual purchases, the same problem arises if we ask 
whether one should adopt a personal food policy. For example, it is doubtful that your 
becoming vegetarian will make a difference to the suffering of animals. Suppose you 
would buy four chickens each month, were you not vegetarian. If you live for sixty more 
years from the time you become vegetarian, this means 2,880 fewer chickens are 
purchased in virtue of your being vegetarian. But you cannot figure out whether your 
being a vegetarian makes a difference by asking, “would the factory farm change 
production if 2,880 fewer chickens were purchased?” As Russ Shafer-Landau says, “The 
fact that one has spent ten thousand dollars over a lifetime does not entail that one has 
exercised during one’s lifetime the causal influence attainable by a one-time ten thousand 
dollar purchase” (Shafer-Landau 1994, 89). Perhaps the factory farm looks at data about 
sales on a monthly basis and decides whether to alter production. A difference in sales of 
four purchases in a month surely will not affect their production decisions. But if that is 
so, then your being vegetarian does not make a difference to what they do. 
6 A classic example is voting in a large national election: if enough of us vote for the 
better candidate, we together can bring it about that she is elected; but your individual 
vote, you can be sure, is not going to make a difference. 
In this essay, I discuss a number of responses to the problem. I do 
not attempt to cover every potentially promising response. Rather, I focus 
on a selection of responses that seem to me to be particularly salient in 
food choices cases. In the next section, I consider two attempts to solve 
the problem by denying the “it won’t make a difference” claim. In the 
following section, I discuss appeals to what I call “non-instrumental” 
moral reasons: reasons that do not have to do with making a significant 
instrumental contribution. And there I explore a phenomenon that suggests 
that many people think of the morality of food choices in a not-purely-
instrumental way: many people who are vegetarian (for moral reasons) 
will not eat meat even when they know it would otherwise simply go to 
waste. I explore whether thinking about the motivations of such 
vegetarians might help solve our problem. In the concluding section of the 
essay, I briefly explain my own view about where the solution to the 
problem lies. 
Before proceeding, a clarification: not just any moral reason or 
requirement is a candidate solution. Suppose you argue that there is 
something intrinsically wrong with eating animals, separate from anything 
to do with animal suffering or environmental damage. This would be a 
story about why one ought not to eat meat, but it is not even a candidate to 
solve the problem of collective impact that arises with respect to meat 
consumption. The problem of collective impact is a problem specifically 
about the fact that our food choices, taken collectively, can have a major 
influence on certain morally important outcomes (e.g., animal suffering, 
worker exploitation, environmental damage). It seems that this should 
mean that each of us has strong moral reason to make certain sorts of food 
choices rather than others, but it is not clear how this can work given the 
apparent instrumental insignificance of any individual choice. We cannot 
address this problem by invoking moral considerations that have nothing 
to do with those outcomes. That would be to just change the topic. I will 
not always be explicit about this. I will often use “moral reason” as short 
for “moral reason that has to do with the outcome of concern.” 
You Can Make a Difference 
One common reaction to the “my purchase won’t make a difference” 
claim is to try to deny its truth. If it is not true that it will not make a 
difference then, presumably, the problem is dissolved. In this section, I 
consider what seem to be the two most promising ways to take this 
approach. 
Making a Difference Indirectly 
If one is trying to show that a single purchase actually can make a 
difference, a natural place to look is the influence one’s own actions can 
have on other people. If my purchase influences others to buy as I do, then 
whether or not I make a difference does not depend only on whether my 
choice directly effects a relevant change in production levels or business 
practices. I will have made a difference if the combination of my choice 
and the choices of those I influence, taken together, results in a change. 
Once we take this into account—the claim goes—we see that I very well 
could make a difference.7 
There is definitely an important point in this response: we should 
not forget about the ways our decisions can influence others. This can 
affect what one should do. However, this will not work as a solution to the 
problem. The most obvious issue is that it does not apply generally 
enough. First, for most of us, our individual everyday purchases do not 
usually influence others to act similarly. More often than not, what I buy 
in the grocery store is not noticed by anyone; let alone causing anyone to 
make similar choices. Second, even when a purchase does influence 
others, unless one is a particularly “watched” person (a celebrity, 
politician, etc.), it probably does not influence enough others for this 
influence to provide grounds for thinking that the act made a difference. If 
my mom and brother are influenced by my decision to eat lentils rather 
 
7 Lane (forthcoming) advances an approach of this sort in discussing the problem of 
collective impact that arises with respect to climate change. 
than chicken at the restaurant tonight, and they do the same, it seems just 
as doubtful that this will make a difference to production on factory farms 
as the case in which they are not influenced. 
There is at least one way in which an “ordinary” person’s purchase 
could make a difference via its influence. Occasionally, not only does one 
person influence others, but those people influence further others, and so 
on. If your influence compounds in this way, it is plausible that the 
outcome would have been relevantly different had you not acted as you 
did.8 We should take this possibility into account. But we also should not 
overestimate our ability to have this sort of compounding influence. For 
most of us, most of our purchases do not set off any such chain reactions. 
Now, what if one says: “I see that you were hoping that there 
would be a solution that applies to everyone, at all times. But there isn’t. 
The best we have is that morality tells us to make the choices in question 
when one could have a substantial influence.” This reply means accepting 
that many of us have no moral reason, much of the time, to make the 
choices in question, and that is the main reason to be dissatisfied with it. 
But it is also worth noticing what this entails for the content of the indirect 
difference-making reason itself. Suppose that Beyoncé is spotted 
 
8 Norcross (2004, 233) makes this point, but his main argument is the one I will discuss 
in the “Expected Utility” section. Glover (1975, 179–181) discusses a slightly different 
version of compounding influence. 
purchasing a cup of fair trade coffee, and this leads thousands of people to 
start choosing fair trade. Their taking it that Beyoncé thinks buying fair 
trade is morally important makes thousands of fans think so too and thus 
follow suit. If indirect difference-making were the only answer to the 
problem of collective impact, then—unlike Beyoncé—most of these fans 
have no moral reason to choose the fair trade coffee, since most do not 
have the relevant kind of influence. But this would mean that what the 
proposal says is that the moral reason Beyoncé had to purchase fair trade 
was, essentially, that by doing so she could fool people into doing 
something that morality does not recommend that they do—something 
morally pointless. This is highly unintuitive. It is far from what most of us 
have in mind when we think of influential people as having moral reason 
to make certain choices because of their power of influence. Intuitively, 
what someone like Beyoncé has moral reason to do is use her influence to 
get others acting in morally good ways—not to fool them into doing things 
that are pointless. This intuitive conception implicitly relies on there being 
a separate solution to the problem of collective impact. 
We already have enough reason to be unsatisfied with the indirect 
difference-making proposal. However, there is a more basic issue with 
it—one that sheds light on the search for a solution more generally. To 
bring this out: imagine that we live in a world in which most people do 
have the influencing potential necessary for their everyday purchases to 
frequently make an indirect difference. Even in such a world, I do not 
think we should be satisfied with the indirect difference-making proposal. 
In such a world, our influencing potential would give each of us moral 
reason, or a presumptive moral obligation, not to eat meat, to buy ethically 
produced coffee, and so on. But it would only do so because of an 
empirical contingency that is not necessitated or made true by the 
conditions that give rise to the problem. Such a consideration does not 
address what is at issue in the problem. 
The problem of collective impact is that it seems that 
(A) The fact that if enough of us make certain readily available 
food choices rather than others, grave harms or injustices would be 
prevented or reduced  
 
should be enough empirically for morality to yield that 
(B) Each of us has a (presumptive) moral obligation, or at least 
good moral reason, to make those choices. 
 
But it is unclear how this can work, given that 
(C) What one does individually does not seem to make a 
difference.  
 
A moral reason that depends on empirical contingencies besides either (A) 
or the conditions that give rise to (A) does not address that problem. Or, to 
put it another way: if such a reason is your answer, then you are really 
biting the bullet on the issue. You are accepting that despite (A), it could 
very well be that each of us has no moral reason to make the relevant 
choices. You are accepting, in other words, that unless certain additional 
things happen to be true, there would be no moral reason for individuals to 
refrain from eating factory-farmed meat or to buy fair trade coffee, and so 
on, even though if enough of us do so we could prevent tremendous 
suffering or injustice. I am not ruling out that biting that bullet could be 
the right way to go. But we certainly should thoroughly explore non-
bullet-biting solutions before we accept such a conclusion. 
Expected Utility 
A popular approach to the problem among philosophers is to appeal to 
chances of making a difference. Those who take this approach argue that 
in the cases in question, there is always at least some chance of making a 
difference. Now, merely showing that there is some chance of making a 
difference is not enough. If my eating factory-farmed meat has only a 
miniscule chance of making a difference for the worse, it is still going to 
be unclear why morality would require or recommend refraining. After all, 
almost any action you could perform has at least a miniscule chance of 
going awry and causing some negative outcome. But what these 
philosophers argue is that given what we can know about the chances of 
making a difference, we can see that a calculation of expected utility will 
yield the moral verdicts we are looking for. Shelly Kagan, Alastair 
Norcross, and Peter Singer each give arguments of this sort in the case of 
purchasing factory-farmed chicken.9 Their specific presentations vary, but 
their core argument is the same. Here it is. 
Suppose the executives of a factory farm review their numbers—
sales, profits, and so on—on a monthly basis. While the company is not 
going to adjust production depending on whether one or two fewer 
chickens were sold this month than projected, there must be some point at 
which a shortfall in sales would lead them to decrease production. Let us 
suppose that quantity is 1,000 chickens. That is, 1,000 chickens is the 
“unit” that they make decisions in terms of. For every shortfall of 1,000 
chickens in a given month, the factory farm will respond by cutting 
production by 1,000 chickens the next month. In this case, each consumer 
has a 1/1,000 chance of saving 1,000 chickens from a life of suffering on 
the factory farm. 
Why a 1/1,000 chance? Because this—the claim goes—is the 
chance that the shortfall in a given month is an exact multiple of 1,000, 
and one’s refraining from buying a chicken makes a difference if and only 
if the shortfall is an exact multiple of 1,000. To illustrate the latter claim: 
suppose the shortfall is exactly 2,000, and thus that there is a decrease in 
 
9 See Singer 1980, Norcross 2004, and Kagan 2011. 
production the next month by 2,000 chickens. In this case, had you 
purchased a chicken, the shortfall would have been 1,999, and the decline 
in production that would have resulted would have only been 1,000. So, 
your refraining made the difference between 1,000 more chickens 
suffering and not. In contrast, if the shortfall is anything other than a 
multiple of 1,000, then your refraining made no difference at all to chicken 
production. 
The final step of the argument is to show that this 1/1,000 chance, 
while small, is enough for the expected utility to come out against 
purchasing a chicken. This is straightforward. A 1/1,000 chance of 
preventing 1,000 chickens from lives of suffering is an expected utility 
equivalent to a 100% chance of saving a single chicken from that life. By 
the highly plausible assumption that the benefits obtained by my 
purchasing a chicken are less substantial than the harms caused to a 
chicken on a factory farm, it follows that the expected utility of refraining 
is higher than the expected utility of purchasing a chicken, and thus that—
on the expected utility model—I ought to refrain. 
As those who advance this argument emphasize, the particular 
number chosen (in my case, 1,000) does not matter. What the argument 
relies on, though, are the following two claims: 
(1) There is some number N, such that for each shortfall in sales of 
N chickens, the company will decrease production by a 
corresponding N chickens.10 
 
(2) The probability that the shortfall will be an exact multiple of N 
is 1/N. 
 
The chief problem with the argument is that these claims need not be true, 
or even close to true. 
Regarding (1): there is no reason to assume that the decrease in 
production triggered by a shortfall will match the size of the shortfall.11 
The intuition that they must match comes from the thought that the factory 
farm will want supply to match demand. But there are many strategies a 
factory farm could take to bring supply in alignment with demand, 
including marketing campaigns, searching for new buyers within the 
market, finding new markets to sell to, and so on. So, even if they take a 
shortfall of N or higher to indicate that demand has dropped far enough to 
 
10 It is not strictly speaking true that their argument relies on (1). What it relies on is that 
there are thresholds at which a decline in sales will trigger a decrease in production, and 
that the decrease in production triggered will match (or roughly match) the size of the 
threshold decline in sales. The numbers do not have to be as neat as their actual 
arguments suggest, and so do not need to be as neat as in (1). But just as their arguments 
do not strictly speaking depend on the numbers being as neat as they have them, my 
objection here does not depend on it. So, there is no loss of generality in putting my 
critique in terms of (1). 
11 I make this point in Nefsky 2011, 369–371. You might think there is a more basic 
issue: Are there really precise numbers at which the executives would make different 
production decisions give or take a single purchase? I argue in Nefsky 2011 against the 
claim that in all collective impact cases there must be sharp thresholds like this. But it 
would not be worth pressing that line here because I think that most (though, not 
necessarily all) food choice cases do contain sharp thresholds (though they will typically 
be unknown and might vary from moment to moment). 
warrant a decrease in production, they need not take it to warrant or 
require a decrease by a corresponding N or more chickens. They could, 
instead, take a “mixed” strategy, for example, some decrease in production 
(much less than N) and some expansion into new markets. Since this could 
very well be how things go, there is no a priori reason to think that the 
expected utility model will yield that you ought not to purchase a chicken. 
It could easily come out the opposite. 
Things are much worse for the expected utility argument than that. 
Mark Budolfson has persuasively argued that claim (2) not only need not 
be true, but is provably false in the world we live in.12 His argument is 
roughly as follows. First, we know that massive companies like factory 
farms, and the businesses they sell to, have large “buffers” built in—
practices and pricing strategies that ensure that the farm will not have to 
adjust production based on smallish deviations in sales. What this means is 
that the size that a shortfall in sales would have to reach (“N”) for the 
response to be a decrease in production is going to be large. For example, 
perhaps for every 5% shortfall in overall sales, the factory farm will 
decrease production.13 For Tyson in 2013, this would be an N equal to 
 
12 Budolfson, forthcoming. 
13 While writing this essay, I had the opportunity to speak to an executive at a large 
agricultural company (who prefers to remain anonymous), and my conversation with him 
suggested that, at least for some companies, 5% is not even high enough. I asked him 
approximately 8 million chickens. But once we know that we are talking 
about numbers like this, we know that the chance of making a difference is 
not going to be anywhere close to 1/N. The chance of making a difference 
is 1/N only if we assume that any size shortfall is equally likely as any 
other. But not all consumer behavior is equally likely; it is much more 
likely that consumers will behave close to how the company projects, and 
for it to be as much as 8 million purchases off is extremely unlikely. What 
this means is that the probability of being in the vicinity of a threshold at 
which they would decrease production is very low, and the probability of 
hitting one of these thresholds exactly, such that a single purchase makes a 
difference, is “nearly infinitesimal.”14 It is going to be, in other words, 
nowhere near what it would need to be for the expected utility model to 
yield that one ought not to purchase a chicken. 
Conclusion So Far 
It is doubtful that we can solve the problem of collective impact in food-
choice cases by rejecting the “it won’t make a difference” claim: in many 
of these cases, for many people, one’s purchases effectively will not make 
a difference. 
 
about whether the current gluten-free diet trend resulted in a decrease in wheat 
production in his company, and he said “no.” He explained that this trend only resulted in 
a “5% hit in the market,” and that that small of a decline “doesn’t really matter to them.” 
14 Budolfson, forthcoming, 11. 
A natural place to turn at this point is to what I call “non-
instrumental” moral reasons: moral considerations that do not have to do 
with playing a significant instrumental role in preventing the relevant 
harms or injustices, and instead concern other ways one’s choice can relate 
to those outcomes. In the next section, I discuss this strategy, focusing in 
on two such proposals. 
Non-Instrumental Reasons 
Consider two kinds of vegetarians: those who would eat already purchased 
meat if they knew that it would otherwise simply go to waste, and those 
who would not. If we are looking for non-instrumental moral reasons to 
refrain from consuming meat, it seems worthwhile to think about the 
second kind of vegetarian. A vegetarian of the first kind might just be 
mistakenly assuming that her refusing to eat meat in “normal” cases will 
actually do something to prevent animal suffering. The second kind of 
vegetarian, on the other hand, clearly has other sorts of reasons in mind. 
To make this concrete, take the following case: 
Leftovers: You are housesitting for your Aunt Neta, who left town 
this morning. In her fridge you find some very tasty-looking 
leftover chicken. You know that these are leftovers from her dinner 
last night, and thus that they would be safe to eat. But you know 
that were this food to wait until she came back, it would be 
spoiled. You are the only one who could eat it. It will merely go to 
waste if you don’t eat it. 
 
Many, though not all, vegetarians would not eat the leftovers in this case. 
Some would not eat them because of “non-moral” reasons: for instance, 
they think it would be unhealthy, or they have no desire to eat it. But I take 
it that there are vegetarians who would not eat it for moral reasons, and in 
particular, reasons having to do with the suffering animals undergo on 
factory farms. If there are such moral considerations speaking against 
eating meat in Leftovers, it seems these should be able to provide a 
relevant answer as to why we should not consume meat in the normal 
case. 
Here is one explanation, though, for not eating the meat in 
Leftovers that doesn’t fit that bill: “If I eat meat in this context, this might 
lead me to be tempted to do so at other times, when it won’t merely go to 
waste.” This story for why I ought not to eat meat in Leftovers only works 
if (a) it is really true that doing so might lead me to eat meat at other times, 
and (b) it is really true that I ought not to eat it at those other times. 
Whether (a) is true will vary individual-by-individual. Whether (b) is true 
depends on whether there is a solution to the problem of collective impact. 
This explanation, thus, presupposes rather than provides an answer to the 
problem. 
But perhaps other moral reasons for not eating meat in Leftovers 
will do better. 
Benefiting from Wrongdoing 
One answer is that eating the meat would amount to benefiting from 
someone else’s wrongdoing, and this is something one ought not to do. 
Factory farms wrongfully torture the animals they raise for slaughter. If 
Aunt Neta’s chicken was produced on a factory farm, then if you eat it, 
you would be voluntarily enjoying a product of this morally abhorrent 
behavior. This is something you ought not to do. If this can explain why 
you ought not to eat the meat in Leftovers, it should work in normal cases 
of consuming factory-farmed meat too.15 
This proposal has some intuitive appeal, but I do not think it 
works. First, I do not think it is true that the mere fact that one is 
benefiting from wrongdoing makes one’s action wrong. Consider this case 
from Christian Barry and David Wiens: 
Terrorist Bombing: “A terrorist sets off a bomb, which 
grievously injures several people. To avoid the explosion, 
Bill retreats to a nearby café, where he meets Susan. Their 
chance meeting eventually gives rise to an extremely 
lucrative business partnership.”16 
 
15 Holly Lawford-Smith gives this proposal (2015, 317–318), but it is not her main 
proposal. I discuss her main proposal below in note 23. Note that the “benefiting from 
wrongdoing” proposal is an example of a candidate solution that seems available in food-
choice cases, but not in various others in which the problem of collective impact arises. It 
clearly could not work, for instance, to explain why one should vote in the national 
election: you are not benefiting from someone else’s wrongdoing by not voting. 
16 Barry and Wiens, 2016, 3. 
In engaging in this partnership, Bill and Susan are benefiting from 
wrongdoing: they would not have met, and thus could not have started this 
business, had the bombing not occurred. But clearly, in doing so, Bill and 
Susan are doing nothing wrong.17 Or, at least, the fact that they would be 
benefiting from someone else’s wrongdoing does nothing to make their 
engaging in it wrong. (It could be wrong for other reasons.) This, at first 
pass, shows that benefiting from wrongdoing is not in itself wrongful. 
Some might reply, though, that this is not a counterexample to the 
view they have in mind because Bill and Susan are not benefiting from 
wrongdoing in the relevant sense. Bill and Susan’s benefiting is only an 
incidental consequence of the wrongdoing: it was a mere coincidence that 
the bombing lead to their meeting. To count as “benefiting from 
wrongdoing” in the relevant sense—they could say—there must be a non-
incidental connection between the wrongdoing and the benefiting.18 
But even on this narrower conception, I do not think it is true that 
the mere fact that one is benefiting from wrongdoing is enough to make 
one’s act wrong. Consider: 
 
17 Barry and Wiens use the case to show that a closely related but distinct view is 
mistaken: namely, the view that those who benefit from wrongdoing owe special duties 
of compensation to the victims of that wrongdoing. 
18 Thanks to Mark Budolfson, Tyler Doggett, and Sergio Tenenbaum for raising this 
point. 
Medical Treatment: Beth receives a medical treatment, which 
saves her life. The discovery of this treatment is owed ultimately to 
a discovery made by Nazi experiments on concentration camp 
victims. 
 
Here the connection between the wrongdoing and the benefiting is non-
incidental: the Nazi experiments were aimed specifically at advancement 
in medical treatments. But even if she knew the history of the discovery of 
the treatment, it seems clear to me that Beth did nothing wrong in 
accepting the treatment, and thus in (knowingly) benefiting from 
wrongdoing.  
 Some, however, might have different intuitions. They might think 
that there is something at least pro tanto wrong with using such a 
treatment, but that perhaps in serious enough situations (like Beth’s life-
and-death situation) the pro tanto wrongness is outweighed by the benefits 
of using the treatment. But even if this is correct, would it be the mere fact 
that Beth is benefiting from the Nazi’s wrongdoing that makes it pro tanto 
wrong? There are other more plausible explanations. For instance: perhaps 
if people like Beth are willing to use this treatment, this could set a risky 
precedent, potentially encouraging current researchers to violate codes of 
ethics when they think the payoffs will be high. This could make it pro 
tanto wrong to use the treatment.19   
 
19 Thanks to Wayne Sumner for a helpful discussion of this point. 
 In general, it seems to me that when benefiting from someone 
else’s past wrongdoing is wrong, there is some other or further 
consideration that makes it wrong.20 But suppose I am incorrect about this, 
and the mere fact that one is benefiting from someone else’s past 
wrongdoing can make one’s act wrong. Even if so, I do not think the 
“benefiting from wrongdoing” proposal works as a solution to the problem 
of collective impact. This is because, as with the indirect difference-
making proposal, it depends for its application on empirical contingencies 
that need not hold as far as the conditions that give rise to the problem are 
concerned. First, it is not always true that by buying or consuming a 
product one is benefiting. Imagine that you buy some factory-farmed 
meat, but then throw it out because you end up finding it repulsive. In this 
case, you are clearly not benefiting from this purchase.21 Indeed, we can 
imagine cases in which someone chooses to buy factory-farmed meat 
without even having the aim or expectation of benefiting from doing so. 
Imagine that you predict in advance that you will be repulsed by the meat 
 
20 One thing I have heard people say to try to support the idea that it is really the 
benefiting from wrongdoing that makes it pro tanto wrong for Beth to accept the 
treatment is that learning about the history of the treatment should have an emotional 
effect on Beth. She should feel disturbed by the fact that the treatment that she will or 
might take was discovered in this way. But I do not think this in any way shows that 
using the treatment is pro tanto wrong. We can fully understand why Beth should have a 
response like that without supposing that there is anything morally wrong with accepting 
the treatment. 
21 Thanks to Tyler Doggett for this example. 
and that you will just throw it out; you do not expect to benefit from your 
purchase. Deciding to purchase meat in this case certainly seems very odd, 
and maybe even irrational, but it is still possible. And the “benefiting from 
wrongdoing” proposal has nothing to say against it. This is unacceptable 
as far as solving the problem of collective impact is concerned. A solution 
should be able to explain why there is moral reason not to make such 
consumer choices, regardless of whether or not one will, or expects to, 
benefit from doing so. 
 Perhaps advocates of the proposal would reply by claiming that 
they mean to be using “benefit” in a technical sense, such that any use or 
purchase of a product counts as “benefiting”. The proposal then becomes 
just: “using or purchasing the products of wrongdoing is wrong.” But even 
if they can make that move, this does not fully remove the trouble. This is 
because the problem of collective impact can arise in food choice cases 
even if there has not already been a wrong committed. 
 Imagine, for instance, that there is very good reason to expect that 
if demand for a certain product gets high enough, the company that 
produces it will switch its production strategy (in order to accommodate 
the increase in demand) from one that is environmentally friendly and 
humane to one that will result in serious harm to the environment, workers 
or animals. Suppose that given the growing popularity of this product, 
there is good reason to be concerned that this will happen. Given this 
serious risk of harm, it seems that we should be able to explain why 
individuals ought, or at least have good reason, to refrain from buying this 
product. So, the problem of collective impact arises here. But the revised 
“benefiting from wrongdoing” proposal does not apply in this case, 
because it is not be true that if you buy the product you are buying a 
product of wrongdoing. The company has not yet done anything wrong. 
 Thus, similar to the indirect difference-making proposal, the 
“benefiting from wrongdoing” proposal effectively bites the bullet on the 
problem of collective impact, rather than solve it. As far as the proposal is 
concerned, unless certain sorts of contingent factors happen to hold 
(namely, there is past wrongdoing, and one would be benefiting from it), 
there is no moral reason for consumers to refrain from making purchases 
that are likely to collectively result in great harm or injustice. 
Expressive Reasons 
Perhaps a different non-instrumental proposal will work better. A different 
answer to the question of what moral point there is in refraining from 
eating meat in “mere waste” cases like Leftovers is that our food choices 
have symbolic or expressive significance, independent of any causal 
influence they might have. By choosing not to eat Aunt Neta’s leftover 
chicken, despite how tasty it looks, one expresses, even if only to oneself, 
one’s commitment to animal welfare and disapproval of factory farming. 
The same goes in normal cases of deciding whether to purchase and eat 
meat. Even if your purchase of a chicken will not have any effect on what 
happens on the factory farm, by refraining you express your disapproval of 
the chicken industry and your concern for animal welfare. This—the claim 
goes—is something you ought to do. On the other hand, if you purchase 
factory-farmed meat, in the knowledge of the horrendous treatment of 
animals on these farms, this expresses support for that horrendous 
treatment, and this is something you ought, or have reason, not to do. 
Now, one way the expressive power of an action can give you 
reason to do it is if, through this expressive power, you can influence 
others to act similarly. But this falls under the “indirect difference-
making” approach we already discussed.22 For the proposal here to be 
 
22 Lawford-Smith’s main proposal falls in this category. According to Lawford-Smith, 
one ought to buy ethically sourced products because this can be a way of signaling one’s 
willingness to form with others a collective agent that will work toward stopping the 
relevant harms or injustices. She claims that signaling one’s willingness to cooperate, 
through buying certain products rather than others, “prevents others from believing that 
their own cooperative actions would be futile, and sends the message that collective 
action is possible” (2015, 322). This, she argues, is an important step toward actually 
forming such a collective. This proposal is a version of the indirect difference-making 
proposal. As Lawford-Smith says, it is “a consequentialist justification to actions that are 
normally taken to have mere expressive value” (2015, 325). Lawford-Smith is pointing 
out something important in arguing that our purchasing decisions can, in certain contexts, 
play this sort of role. But, for the same reasons as those discussed in considering the 
distinct, the idea has to be that what your act expresses matters morally in 
itself, even if it has no potential influence on the conduct of others. In 
other words, the reason has to be purely expressive.23 
One question is whether we really think there are moral reasons of 
a purely expressive variety. I will not take a stand on this here, and will 
instead simply assume for the sake of discussion that there are. A second 
question is: Even if we do have purely expressive moral reasons, are these 
going to be able to support any sort of moral requirement to avoid 
purchasing factory-farmed meat, to purchase fair trade coffee, and so on? 
Christopher Kutz, who appeals to purely expressive reasons, does not 
think so and concludes from this that they are only a partial solution to the 
problem. He writes: 
It is doubtful whether any plausible construction of 
morality could require outcome-independent self-sacrifice. 
. . . Like other supererogatory actions, symbolic actions fit 
awkwardly with a pure ethics of obligation. Nonetheless 
they have a firm place within a broader ethics of value.24 
 
 
indirect difference-making strategy, this proposal cannot satisfactorily solve the problem 
of collective impact. 
23 The idea that our acts can have moral value purely in virtue of what they express has 
been advanced by Adams (1999) and Hill (1979). Kutz (2000) advocates for the 
expressive proposal as a partial solution to the problem of collective impact (see ch. 6), as 
does Lane (forthcoming). The expressive proposal also has been prominent as a reply in 
the case of voting and various other political activities (e.g., attending a large political 
protest). See, for instance, Benn 1979 and Brennan and Lomasky 1989 and 1993. 
24 Kutz 2000, 191. 
However, if one really accepts the idea that what one’s act expresses 
matters morally in itself, it is not clear why one should rule out that there 
can be obligations coming purely from expressive considerations. In 
particular, at least insofar as the reasons you have to want to consume 
factory-farmed meat, or drink unethically produced coffee, are relatively 
weak matters of personal preference (e.g., the taste or wanting to spend 
less money so that you have more for entertainment), why not think that 
the expressive considerations outweigh those reasons, and thus obligate 
you? To use an example from Russ Shafer-Landau, we might think that 
one acts wrongly if one voices “support for a racist dictator overseas,” and 
we might think this “even if one’s expression has no causal impact 
whatever on the treatment of the oppressed.”25 Similarly, we might think 
one acts wrongly if one voices support for factory farming, even if one’s 
expression will not have a causal impact. 
But there is a much more decisive, internal problem for the 
expressive approach. The problem is: even if it is true that we have purely 
expressive moral reasons, these will only be reasons to do the things we 
are talking about—to refrain from eating factory-farmed meat, to choose 
fair trade, and so on—if those choices will have the expressive 
significance in question. But they do not necessarily have that 
 
25 Shafer-Landau 1994, 96. 
significance, and when we think about what needs to be true for them to 
have it, we find that expressive reasons cannot be said to solve the 
problem of collective impact. 
Consider the following two cases. 
Lisa: Lisa is out for dinner. She orders the vegetable lasagna, 
rather than a meat option, because she feels like it, and not because 
of anything to do with animal welfare.  
 
In this case, at least insofar as her reasons for choosing the lasagna are 
clear to her and those around her, Lisa’s choice does not seem to express 
concern for animals or disapproval of factory farming. 
Ben: Ben is out for dinner. He orders the Cajun chicken rather than 
a vegetarian option because he loves the taste of Cajun chicken and 
because he justifiably and correctly believes that his ordering it 
will not make any difference for the worse to animals. He cares a 
great deal about the well-being of animals, and if he had any 
reason to believe that his ordering this chicken could negatively 
affect animals, he would have chosen a vegetarian option.  
 
At first pass, at least insofar as his motivations are clear to him and those 
around him, Ben’s choice does not express disregard for animals or 
approval of factory farming. He has no such attitudes: he cares about 
animal welfare, and he disapproves of factory farming. And his choice 
does not express otherwise because it is clear to everyone that he is only 
making it because he justifiably believes it will not have any negative 
impact on animals.26 
As we will see, these initial verdicts about Ben and Lisa could turn 
out to be false depending on certain further factors. But what these initial 
verdicts bring out is that just because a product was made in an unethical 
way, or by an industry that has caused or will cause serious harms, this is 
not by itself enough to entail that your choice to consume it expresses an 
attitude of approval of those unethical practices, or of disregard for those 
who were or will be harmed. And it is not enough to entail that your 
choice to refrain from consuming it expresses an attitude of disapproval of 
those practices, or of concern for those who were or will be harmed. 
How could these choices reliably gain the expressive significances 
in question? Here is one way: if there is an independent solution to the 
problem of collective impact, and we either know or should know it. By 
“independent solution,” I mean a solution that does not appeal to 
expressive reasons—so, some other morally relevant consideration that 
explains why individuals should make the choices in question. Suppose 
that there is such a moral consideration, R. So, R would be a moral 
consideration against purchasing factory-farmed meat, and one that has to 
do with the suffering of animals on factory farms. If I know this, or even 
 
26 For a related point, see Driver 2015, 74–75. 
just should know it, then if I go ahead and purchase a factory-farmed 
chicken anyway, this does express disregard for animals. It expresses 
disregard because in making this choice I am ignoring or failing to see the 
reason that their suffering gives me. Conversely, if you refuse to eat 
chicken because of R, then your refusal expresses disapproval of animal 
suffering and factory-farming practices.27 
If the food choices in question gain expressive significance via an 
independent solution, then expressive reasons can provide additional 
grounds for making the right choices. But these expressive reasons would 
not be solving the problem of collective impact. The expressive reasons 
only apply here in virtue of the fact that there is a prior solution.28 
What this means is that to see if expressive considerations could 
solve the problem, we need to consider how the choices in question could 
carry the relevant expressive significances if there is no expressive-
independent solution. So, suppose that if there is a relevant moral story as 
to why individuals should refrain from purchasing factory-farmed meat, or 
should buy fair trade coffee, and so on, it will have to be one that appeals 
 
27 Note the asymmetry: with a known independent solution to the problem, the choice to 
go ahead and eat meat can express disregard, even if the person is not doing it for any 
“anti-animal” reasons. In contrast, the choice to refrain from eating meat would not 
automatically carry the “positive” expressive significance. For it to have that 
significance, you need—I think—to make the choice for those reasons, or at least under 
the appearance that those are your reasons. 
28 The same point holds if the choice gains expressive significance because we falsely 
believe there is an independent solution. 
to purely expressive considerations. All other options have been correctly 
ruled out. 
Recall Ben: it seemed initially that he does not express any bad 
attitude toward animals when he chooses the chicken for dinner. He is 
only making this choice because he knows this will not make any 
difference for the worse to animals. We have already seen that this was too 
quick: if there is another independent moral story as to why he ought not 
to eat it, and one having to do with animal suffering on factory farms, and 
if he does or at least should know this, then his choice would still express 
disregard. But if there is no relevant non-expressive story as to why eating 
meat is wrong, and if everyone knows this, how can we say he is 
expressing disregard by making that choice? 
There is one way: Ben’s action could express disregard for animals 
if there is a societal convention that imbues this sort of choice with that 
expressive significance. Wearing green clothes on Earth Day can 
symbolize one’s commitment to the environment. Wearing a shirt with the 
Confederate Flag on it expresses racism, or a lack of concern for those 
who have been victims of racism. These acts carry the expressive 
significance they do because of some process by which society imbued 
them with that meaning, and not through the fact that there is an 
independent moral story about why one ought to wear all green on April 
22, or refrain from wearing a red shirt with a blue “X” with white stars on 
it. Our individual food choices could acquire expressive significance in a 
similar way. Perhaps, then, the act of purchasing a chicken symbolizes by 
way of societal convention29 a lack of concern for animal welfare, whereas 
purchasing lentils symbolizes the opposite. 
If our food choices did carry expressive significance through 
societal convention, then if there are the purely expressive moral reasons 
in question, these will indeed be reasons to refrain from eating meat, to 
buy fair trade coffee, and so on. But even if all of this is so, this does not 
solve our problem. The very fact that we can imagine a society in which 
the problem of collective impact arises, and in just the same way as it does 
in our society, but in which there are no such expressive conventions in 
place, shows this. The issue here is again the same as with the indirect 
difference-making proposal. The expressive reasons would only apply in 
virtue of an empirical contingency (in this case: a contingent expressive 
convention) that is not necessitated or made true by any of the conditions 
that give rise to the problem. Such reasons do not address the theoretical 
 
29 I am using the term “convention” only in a weak sense: just to mean that these choices 
were imbued, to some extent arbitrarily, with these meanings by some sort of social 
process. I do not mean to commit to any particular view about how something (an action, 
a word) can be imbued with meaning in a society. In this weak sense of “convention,” all 
word meaning is conventional, regardless of one’s theory about how words acquire 
meaning. (See the introduction to section 7 of Rescorla 2015.) Thank you to Olivia 
Sultanescu for drawing my attention to the need to clarify this. 
puzzle at issue. And practically speaking: they do not give a stable, secure 
answer to the question of why individuals should refrain from making 
choices that will collectively result in tremendous harm and injustice. 
They just tell us why insofar as there are certain contingent conventions, 
individuals should refrain from such choices. That is a tenuous position to 
be in.30  
Before moving on, I should mention that there is a final way one’s 
choice could carry the relevant expressive significance: one could 
personally imbue it with that significance. I could declare, “I choose the 
vegetable lasagna to symbolize my disapproval of factory farming.” But 
while I might have moral reason to express this attitude, and while this 
would be one way of doing it, in the absence of either an independent 
solution or a symbolic convention, there would be nothing morally 
requiring or recommending that I express it in that way. In other words, 
 
30 It is worth saying that I am doubtful that there are expressive conventions like these in 
our society at present. I think we can see this with the example of Ben. If there were a 
societal convention that makes ordering chicken an expression of disregard for animal 
suffering, then his “it won’t make a difference to animal suffering” justification would do 
nothing in our ears to remove the expressive significance, just as someone who wears 
confederate-flag pajamas in the privacy of their own home cannot remove the expressive 
complaint in virtue of the fact that they are only doing so because they know that it will 
not make a difference for the worse to anyone. I do not mean to suggest that in our 
society, acts of purchasing meat do not express disregard for animal suffering, or that 
they do not do so for people with Ben’s motivations. As explained, such acts could still 
express those attitudes if there is an expressive-independent solution to the problem, or 
even if some people just believe that there is. And the latter is surely the case. The point 
is just that these expressive significances do not seem to be coming from societal 
convention. 
even if there is a moral reason to express my disapproval of factory 
farming, in the absence of an expressive convention or an independent 
solution, this would not give me reason specifically to refrain from eating 
meat. In such a world, I could just as well express my views by wearing a 
T-shirt with “Factory Farms are Evil!” printed on it. So, pointing out that I 
could imbue my choice with this significance cannot explain why 
individuals have moral reason specifically to make the food choices in 
question, and thus is a nonstarter when it comes to the problem of 
collective impact. 
In summary: expressive considerations do not work to solve the 
problem. They might provide a moral reason or even a requirement to 
(specifically) make the choices in question, but whether they have the 
potential to do so depends on whether there is an independent solution to 
the problem of collective impact or a relevant sort of expressive 
convention. Either way, they cannot do the work of solving the problem. 
Instrumental Contribution and Difference-Making 
At the end of the second section, we took on board the conclusion that for 
many food choices, what one does individually will not make a difference 
with respect to the harms and injustices perpetrated by the food industry. 
From there, we turned to discuss some candidate “non-instrumental” 
solutions. Our search there was not successful. In this final section, I will 
suggest that the reason for that lack of success is not that we did not look 
hard enough in that area, but rather that it is the wrong place to look. 
Return to Leftovers. Does it make sense for a vegetarian to refuse 
on moral grounds, and specifically, grounds having to do with animal 
suffering, to eat meat in a case like this? I think it could. There are at least 
two explanations that could work. One is the temptation story mentioned 
earlier: if it is true of you that eating this chicken would weaken your 
resolve in “normal” cases of deciding what to eat, this could give you 
moral reason, or a requirement, not to eat it. As we said, this only goes 
through if there is a prior solution to the problem of collective impact: an 
answer as to why you normally ought not to consume meat, even though it 
seems it won’t make a difference. But if there is such a solution, this story 
can make sense. 
The second story is an expressive one. I think it is easy—almost 
automatic—for a vegetarian to personally imbue her refusal in a case like 
Leftovers with expressive significance. She need not make any declaration 
like, “I am not going to eat this as a symbol of my disapproval of factory 
farms.” Rather, she can simply not eat it because she is vegetarian. By not 
eating it because she is vegetarian, she makes her choice symbolic of her 
commitment to vegetarianism, and thus of the concerns that lead her to 
become vegetarian. So, if she became vegetarian because of concerns 
about animal suffering, her refusal to eat the meat in Leftovers expresses 
those concerns. If there are moral reasons to express these things, this 
would be a good way of responding to those reasons. But notice: this story 
also presupposes a prior solution to the problem of collective impact. It 
operates by way of the assumption that concerns about animal suffering 
support being vegetarian in the first place.31 
It thus seems that the best explanations for why it can make sense 
for a vegetarian to refuse, on moral grounds, to eat meat in cases like 
Leftovers involve presupposing that there is a solution to the problem of 
collective impact. When there is moral reason not to eat meat in “mere 
waste” cases, this is often derivate on an answer as to why in regular cases 
one ought not to consume it. This suggests that we are not going to solve 
the problem of collective impact by treating regular cases of purchasing 
factory-farmed meat, fair trade coffee, and so on—the cases in which the 
problem arises—as morally the same as “mere waste” cases. 
The temptation to treat them similarly comes from what the “it 
won’t make a difference” claim does. What this claim does, insofar as we 
accept it, is make ordinary cases of purchasing meat, conventional coffee, 
 
31 Note that neither of these two stories implies that a vegetarian who chooses to eat meat 
in “mere waste” cases does anything wrong. 
and so on, seem instrumentally on par with eating Aunt Neta’s chicken in 
Leftovers. If it will not make a difference whether or not I buy meat—if 
things will be the same with respect to the harms in question either way—
this seems to mean that my decision is instrumentally insignificant or 
inert. It gives the impression that it will not do any good for me to refrain, 
and that it will not do any harm for me to go ahead, just like in “mere 
waste” cases. I do not think we can solve the problem of collective impact 
by accepting this picture and turning to non-instrumental considerations. 
Instead, we need to resist it. We need to show that your decision typically 
does matter instrumentally.32 
This is not to say that I think we can solve the problem, after all, 
by showing that one’s individual purchases typically can make a 
difference. For the reasons discussed in the second section, I am doubtful 
that will work. In my view, the answer lies, rather, in seeing that one can 
make a significant instrumental contribution even if one cannot make a 
difference. If my purchasing a cup of fair trade coffee will not make a 
 
32 One might think that another option is to identify a moral difference between normal 
cases and “mere waste” cases, while accepting that they are instrumentally on par. Driver 
(2015) takes this approach, arguing that in normal cases one is complicit in wrongdoing if 
one purchases meat, even if one’s purchase is instrumentally insignificant, while in mere 
waste cases one is not complicit. In Nefsky 2015, I discuss proposals of this sort, and 
argue that they cannot work as solutions to the problem. In particular, when it comes to 
complicity (or, participation in wrongdoing), I argue that for an appeal to complicity to 
address the problem, it needs to be that one is complicit in a sense that involves real 
instrumental contribution. 
difference to the lives of coffee farmers, this tells me that no farmers’ lives 
are going to go differently depending on whether I go with the fair trade 
option. But even if that is true, does it follow that in opting for the fair 
trade option I am not doing anything instrumentally useful toward 
improving the lives of coffee farmers? I think the answer is “no.” 
Notice that the solutions that we considered in the third section did 
not really utilize an important feature of the problem of collective impact: 
the fact that by making certain food choices going forward, we together 
could make a big difference for the better. I think a reply needs to 
capitalize on this fact. Now, consider: What does this fact tell us about 
what you individually can do? 
In the case of meat consumption, if very many people refrain, 
going forward, from buying factory-farmed meat, this will force the meat 
industry to change or scale-back. What this tells us is that if I refrain from 
buying factory-farmed meat, I will be doing precisely what many 
individuals must do if this possibility is to be actualized. That is, I will be 
doing something that someone must do—and someone else, and someone 
else, and so on—if this shift in consumer demand is to occur and thus, if 
this viable route to preventing grave harms is to be taken. Doing such a 
thing is making instrumental progress. You are not by yourself changing 
the outcome, but you are taking a significant step toward change. 
I do not pretend, though, that it is easy to see how this amounts to 
making instrumental progress. Much more needs to be said to make this 
precise, and to debunk the impression that difference-making is required.33 
In my view, the core answer as to why I have moral reason to make the 
food choices in question is the naïve, simple one: doing so makes real 
progress toward preventing grave harms or injustices. But what is hard is 
seeing how this could be true when one’s doing so will not make a 
difference. 
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